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Fixing the Dent: How NFL Owners
Closed the Door to Civil Common
Law Liability
Zachary Okun
I.

Introduction
The 2020 National Football League (“NFL”)
Collective Bargaining Agreement (“CBA”) has been widely
criticized by players and the media alike. 1 However, the
majority of these criticisms focus on the inequities contained
in the CBA’s provisions.2 Beyond the express terms of the
agreement, the 2020 NFL CBA contains a secret—not only
do the CBA’s provisions favor the NFL and its owners over
the players, but the players have lost their ability to bring
common law claims against the NFL under the provisions’
language. 3 This is especially important considering the
NFL’s historical reluctance to implement positive player
programs absent a compelling reason to do so—oftentimes
because of litigation and/or congressional hearings.4 With a
new, eleven-year CBA upon us,5 this paper will discuss in
Section II what a CBA is, the purpose CBAs serve, and the
function and historical treatment of the NFL’s CBA by the
courts. Section II will also explain the NFL arbitration
See, e.g., Daniel Kaplan, ‘Bad Dream’: NFL CBA Disability Changes Under
Fire for Affecting 400 Ex-Players, THE ATHLETIC (May 4, 2020),
https://theathletic.com/1790486/2020/05/04/bad-dream-nfl-cba-disabilitychanges-under-fire-for-affecting-400-ex-players/.
2
Id.
3
See, e.g., NAT’L FOOTBALL LEAGUE & NAT’L FOOTBALL LEAGUE PLAYERS
ASS’N COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT 214–41 (Mar. 3, 2020)
[hereinafter NFL CBA],
https://nflpaweb.blob.core.windows.net/media/Default/NFLPA/CBA2020/NF
L-NFLPA_CBA_March_5_2020.pdf.
4
See, e.g., Kaplan, supra note 1.
5
Id.
1
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process, the reason the NFL fights so hard to enforce
arbitration, and why the players should have been more
cognizant of the provisions within the CBA which act to
insulate the NFL and its Clubs from common law tort
liability. Section III will discuss the NFL’s historical
reliance of the LMRA §301 preemption defense; how the
holdings in Dent v. Nat’l Football League undermined that
reliance; how legal scholars projected that this would affect
the 2020 NFL CBA; and how the holding in Dent was
rendered inconsequential because of the provisional
language included in the 2020 NFL CBA. Section III will
also discuss the reasons the 2020 NFL CBA favors the
owners over the players. Finally, Section IV will discuss the
reasons the National Football League Players Association
(“NFLPA”) failed to capitalize on its elevated bargaining
position, and how it can prevent a similar issue from
occurring in the future by more heavily involving its
veterans and stars in the negotiations process.
II.

Background
A.
What
are
collective
bargaining
agreements and why are they important?
With much of the country suffering the financial
and societal hardships resulting from the Great Depression,
President Franklin Delano Roosevelt implemented a series
of programs aimed at protecting employees “from the
workings of the competitive market.” 6 These programs
comprised “The New Deal.”7 The centerpiece of “The New
Deal” was the formation of employment unions, which was
premised on two main principles: “[(1)] legislation to
protect the rights of workers to join unions and [(2)]
legislation on such workplace issues as safety and health,
HARRY C. KATZ, THOMAS A. KOCHAN & ALEXANDER J. S. COLVIN, AN
INTRODUCTION TO U.S. COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND LABOR RELATIONS 7
(5th ed. 2017).
7
Id.
6
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child labor, minimum wages, unemployment and workers’
compensation, and social security.” 8 To serve these
principles, Congress enacted the National Labor Relations
Act (“NLRA”) in 1935. 9 The NLRA encouraged the
formation of CBAs and afforded employees the ability to
organize themselves into unions by, “[setting] standards for
union elections, and . . . [specifying] unfair labor practices
of employers.”10
However, this mobilization of the labor movement
stifled in 1947 when Congress enacted the Labor
Management Relations Act (“LMRA”).11 As a whole, the
LMRA’s purpose is “to prescribe the legitimate rights of
both employees and employers in their relations . . . [and] to
protect the rights of individual employees in their relations
with labor organizations whose activities affect
commerce.”12 To effect this purpose, the LMRA weakened
union powers to resist CBA provisions, while
simultaneously increasing an employer’s power to enforce a
CBA, by including “a series of prohibited union unfair labor
practices, an expansion of employer ‘free speech’ rights, and
a provision for the use of injunctions against strikes that
imperiled national health and safety.” 13 In particular,
LMRA § 301 operates to prevent employees from bringing
certain tort and contract claims against their employers to
“encourage uniformity of interpretation of collective
Id.
Nairi Dulgarian, How the Holding in Dent v. National Football League
Tackles Collective Bargaining Agreements, 39 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV 205, 209
(2019).
10
Id. (quoting Edwin A. Elliott, The Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947,
29 SW. SOC. SCIENCE Q. 109, 109 (1948)).
11
Dulgarian, supra note 9, at 210.
12
Id. (quoting Morgan Francy, An Open Field for Professional Athlete
Litigation: An Analysis of the Current Application of Section 301 Preemption
in Professional Sports Lawsuits, 70 SMU L. REV. 475, 479 (2017)).
13
Dulgarian, supra note 9, at 210. (quoting JAMES A. GROSS, RIGHTS, NOT
INTERESTS: RESOLVING VALUE CLASHES UNDER THE NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS ACT 25 (2017)).
8
9
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bargaining agreements and prevent . . . interference with
those agreements”14 by promoting the “peaceable, consistent
resolution of labor-management disputes.” 15 In fact,
“Congress intended for § 301 to ‘protect the primacy of
grievance and arbitration as the forum for resolving CBA
disputes and the substantive supremacy of federal law within
that forum.’”16
B.
What is the arbitration process under
the 2020 NFL CBA?
A CBA is the product of a negotiation between an
employer and its employees. 17 For employees, arbitration
agreements contained in CBAs act as mechanisms allowing
them to participate in the decisions that shape their work
lives and employment conditions. 18 For employers—
particularly in the realm of professional sports—arbitration
serves a valuable purpose due to the “availability of a timely
resolution, the ability of parties to rely on the finality of the
decision, and the arbitrator's specialized knowledge of
league rules and customs.”19
The NFL arbitration process is detailed in Articles
43 and 44 of the 2020 NFL CBA.20 Article 43 is the express
remedy for disputes “involving the interpretation of,
application of, or compliance with, any provision of [the
CBA], the NFL Player Contract, the Practice Squad Player
Contract, or any applicable provision of the NFL
Constitution and Bylaws or NFL Rules pertaining to the

29 U.S.C § 185; Dulgarian, supra note 9, at 211 (quoting Francy, supra note
12, at 479).
15
Lingle v. Norge Div. Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 404 (1988).
16
Dent v. Nat'l Football League, 902 F.3d 1109, 1116 (9th Cir. 2018)
[hereinafter Dent I] (quoting Alaska Airlines Inc. v. Schurke, 898 F.3d 904, 920
(9th Cir. 2018) (en banc) (emphasis omitted)).
17
Collective-Bargaining Agreement, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed.
2019); KATZ, KOCHAN, & COLVIN, supra note 6, at 5.
18
KATZ, KOCHAN, & COLVIN, supra note 6, at 5.
19
Dulgarian, supra note 9, at 234–235.
20
NFL CBA, supra note 3, at 256–68.
14
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terms and conditions of employment of NFL players. . . .”21
This “non-injury grievance process” allows for discovery
and prehearing procedures, which promotes the timely
resolution of disputes. 22 After initiating a non-injury
grievance, an arbitration panel is assigned, composed of four
jointly-agreed-upon arbitrators.23 This panel of arbitrators
can be altered by either side with sufficient notice, and the
dismissal of an arbitrator by one party opens the door for the
other party to “discharge any other arbitrator” within two
days. 24 If the parties cannot mutually agree on a certain
arbitrator to fill a vacancy, the “Notice Arbitrator” supplies
a list of qualified arbitrators. 25 From this list, the parties
alternate in striking out the names of potential arbitrators
until one name remains, with the first strike determined by a
coin flip.26 Once assigned to handle a dispute, the arbitrator
issues a written decision within thirty days of receiving the
parties’ briefs.27 The arbitrator’s final decision “constitute[s]
full, final and complete disposition of the grievance, and will
be binding upon the player(s) and Club(s) involved and the
parties to this Agreement . . . .”28 Additionally, Section 13
provides that the Grievance Settlement Committee, a panel
composed of NFLPA representatives and NFL Management
Council representatives, will meet annually to settle or
bifurcate any pending grievances. 29 If the committee
mutually agrees upon the resolution of a grievance, then its
decision “will constitute full, final and complete disposition
Id. at 256.
Id. at 14, at 256–57. Sections 4 and 5 contain strict deadlines and a procedure
of expedited arbitration. See id.
23
Id. at 258.
24
Id.
25
Id.
26
Id.
27
Id. at 259. The arbitrator will not consider briefs filed by either party more
than sixty days prior to the court receiving the last brief unless the parties agree
otherwise. Id.
28
Id.
29
Id. at 260.
21
22
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of the grievance and will be binding upon the player(s) and
the Club(s) involved and the parties to this Agreement.”30
Notably, Article 43 does not contain a provision permitting
a party to appeal the arbitrator’s decision.31
Article 44 contains many provisions similar or
identical to those contained in Article 43. 32 Article 44
governs “injury grievances,” which are claims that “at the
time a player’s NFL Player Contract or Practice Squad
Player Contract was terminated by a Club, the player was
physically unable to perform the services required of him by
that contract because of an injury incurred in the
performance of his services under that contract.”33 Upon the
filing of an injury grievance, the party subject to the
grievance must file an answer that either accepts or denies
the claim and provides their grounds for doing so. 34
Furthermore, the player bringing the claim must present
themselves for a physical examination, including diagnostic
tests, by a neutral physician in the Club’s city or the Club
city closest to the player’s residence within twenty days of
filing the grievance. 35 Then, the neutral physician must
submit a detailed report regarding the medical
examination.36 Article 44 Section 4(b) carves out a special
process for claims alleging that the player suffered a closed
head injury resulting in “cognitive deficit, somatic
symptoms and/or other concussion symptoms.” 37 The
neutral physician follows the same procedure detailed above,
but that player may be subjected to a test spanning multiple
days, or be required to submit to an examination by an
See id. at 256–61.
See id. at 256–62.
See id. at 262–68.
33
Id. at 262.
34
Id. These “special defenses” are listed in Article 44 Section 3(a)(1)–(6). Id.
35
Id. at 263.
36
Id.
37
Id. Note that the examination may only take place if all parties are present.
Id.
30
31
32
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alternate physician if the neutral neuropsychologist is unable
to make a determination.38 Upon a conclusive finding by a
neutral physician, the arbitrator must consider those findings
conclusive regarding the nature and extent of the player’s
injury. 39 The NFL Club and the player asserting a claim
equally share the costs of the neutral physician’s services
and the costs of arbitration, but the individual player bears
the travel expenses associated with traveling to the approved
physician. 40 Only if the player wins will the NFL
compensate them for “reasonable expenses incurred in
traveling to and from his residence to the Club city, lodging
and meal expenses in accordance with Article 34.” 41
Importantly, the arbitrator can award payment for past and
future medical expenses incurred as a result of that injury.42
Unlike Article 43, Article 44 provides that a party may
appeal an injury grievance within seven days.43
C.
Why does the NFL fight so hard to
enforce its arbitration clause, and what
incentive do players have to pursue their
claims in court?
The NFL’s interest in maintaining the reliability and
uniformity of its CBA and its arbitration process is supported
by one overarching premise: litigation reveals some of the
“dirty details” about its handling of certain situations,
thereby exposing the NFL to potentially limitless civil
liability.44
Allowing a grievance by a former player against the
NFL (or one of its Clubs) to continue outside of the
Id.
Id. at 264.
40
Id. at 266.
41
Id. at 266–67.
42
Id. at 267.
43
Id. at 264.
44
See, e.g., J. Philip Calabrese & Dante Marinucci, Far-Reaching
Consequences of NFL Concussion Litigation, L.360 (May 3, 2013),
https://www.law360.com/articles/436512/far-reaching-consequences-of-nflconcussion-litigation.
38
39
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arbitration process and into the courtroom permits the
player-plaintiff to “extract extensive discovery from the
NFL, its teams and third parties, including doctors,
equipment suppliers and others.”45 This, in turn, can and
often does result in additional claims being brought against
the NFL—notwithstanding efforts to negotiate for various
alternative dispute resolution mechanisms.46 For example,
in Dent v. National Football League (Dent II), the plaintiffs’
amended complaint alleging that the NFL was negligent
under a voluntary undertaking theory was based on
information obtained during the discovery of another
negligence case brought against the NFL by a former
player. 47 This discovery revealed that the NFL had
conducted studies about the potential harm caused by
Toradol, a prescription painkiller, and learned about its
harmful effects, but did nothing to quell the players’
widespread abuse of the drug.48 Likewise, in 2013, the NFL
settled a class action lawsuit brought by over 4,500 explayers for upwards of $765 million.49 However, because
the ex-players accused the NFL of fraud (in addition to
negligence) by deliberately hiding the dangers of
concussions from them, the NFL’s insurers argued that they
were not responsible for the league’s legal costs or for
paying the settlement. 50 Of course, these insurance
companies conducted mass discovery of documents from the
Id.
Calabrese & Marinucci, supra note 44.
47
Dent v. Nat’l Football League, 968 F.3d 1126, 1129 n.1 (9th Cir. 2020)
[hereinafter Dent II]; see also Evans v. Arizona Cardinals Football Club, LLC,
No. CV WMN-15-1457, 2016 WL 759208, at *2 (D. Md. Feb. 25, 2016); Evans
v. Arizona Cardinals Football Club LLC, No. C 16-01030 WHA, 2016 WL
3566945, at *4 (N.D. Cal. July 1, 2016).
48
Dent II, 968 F.3d at 1129.
49
Ken Belson, N.F.L. Settles Lengthy Fight with Insurance Company Over
Concussions (Sept. 12, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/12/sports/football/nfl-concussionsettlement.html.
50
Id.
45
46
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NFL and its individual Clubs, which ultimately resulted in
the settlement of the case for an undisclosed amount.51 Not
only that, but the NFL is placed in a difficult position when
defending itself against common law claims, as a single
court’s decision regarding the application of the LMRA §
301 preemption test has the potential to expose the NFL to a
slew of new claims.52
While arbitration is the preferred method for the
NFL to resolve disputes, players have an incentive to try
their cases in civil courts. 53 First, common law claims
brought in court have no damages cap, expose the NFL to
the imposition of punitive damages, and allow players to
bring the NFL’s transgressions against them to light. 54
However, beyond the interests of the individual playerplaintiffs, NFL players have a vested interest in keeping the
door open to litigation—much of the player safety
improvements and protocols are the result of litigation
brought against the NFL.55 The NFL has demonstrated that
it will not implement mechanisms to improve player safety
of its own volition. 56 Thus, the likelihood the NFL will
implement safety protocols in future CBAs is jeopardized by

Id.
See generally Dent I, 902 F.3d 1109 (9th Cir. 2018).
53
See John Bickerman, Increase in Workers Subject to Arbitration Coincides
with Supreme Court Rulings, A.B.A. (Jan. 16, 2022),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/committees/alternativedispute-resolution/practice/2020/increase-in-workers-subject-to-arbitrationcoincides-with-supreme-court-rulings/.
54
Thomas Cain, Painkillers and Preemption: "Dent"-Ing the NFL's Preemption
Defense, 54 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 859, 861–62 (2019).
55
Richard Weinmeyer, Concussion-Related Litigation Against the National
Football League, AM. MED. ASSN’ J. ETHICS (July 2014),
https://journalofethics.ama-assn.org/article/concussion-related-litigationagainst-national-football-leagu/2014-07.
56
Louis Bien, The NFL is Going to Insulting Lengths to Prove That CTE Isn’t
a Problem, SBNATION.COM (Aug. 31, 2017, 1:13 PM),
https://www.sbnation.com/2017/8/31/16233630/nfl-concussion-studyfunding-cte-horse-jockeys.
51
52
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NFL players losing their ability to expose issues through
civil litigation.
III.

The NFL has historically relied upon the
preemption defense under LMRA §301, however
the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Dent undermined
that reliability and opened the door for a playerplaintiff to sue the NFL
Throughout much of its history, the NFL has
enjoyed protection against common law civil suits by former
players.57 Instead, the arbitration process prescribed by the
NFL CBA has long been the only means for an aggrieved
player to seek a remedy against the NFL or an NFL team.58
This was due in large part to the preemption defense offered
under LMRA § 301.59
The protections afforded to an employer by LMRA
§301 are not absolute. Rather, to determine whether a state
law claim brought by an employee against their employer is
preempted by a CBA under LMRA § 301, the courts have
adopted a two-prong test.60 First, courts look to whether the
cause of action arises out of state law, and not solely by
virtue of the CBA.61 If the cause of action “exists solely as
a result of the CBA, then the claim is preempted” and the
court’s analysis does not proceed to the second prong. 62
Second, if the cause of action exists independently from the
provisions in the CBA, however, then the court must inquire
into whether the determination of that claim is “substantially
dependent on [an] analysis of a collective-bargaining
agreement.”63
Kelly A. Heard, The Impact of Preemption in the NFL Concussion Litigation,
68 UNIV. MIA. L. REV. 221, 249 (2013).
58
See discussion infra pp. 10–12.
59
Dent I, 902 F.3d 1109, 1116 (9th Cir. 2018).
60
Id. (quoting Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 394 (1987)).
61
Burnside v. Kiewit Pac. Corp., 491 F.3d 1053, 1059 (9th Cir. 2007).
62
Id.
63
Id. (quoting Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 394 (1987)).
57
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It is at this point that former-player suits against the
NFL usually fail. 64 For example, the NFL has escaped
liability for a state-law wrongful death suit after a former
player committed suicide by arguing that the claim was
preempted under LMRA § 301 because the wrongful death
claim was “substantially dependent upon [an] analysis of the
terms of an agreement made between the parties in a labor
contract.” 65 Moreover, the court found the claim was
preempted because the CBA only imposed duties upon the
NFL teams—not the NFL itself.66 Thus, the court would
have had to interpret the CBA to determine whether the
NFL’s duty was triggered, which they considered to be
consistent with the second prong of the test.67 Similarly, the
NFL has also avoided a state-law negligence claim after a
player died of heat exhaustion and heatstroke during the
preseason. 68 Finding the common law nature of the
plaintiff’s claim was reason enough to hold that the cause of
action arose independently from the NFL CBA, the court
eventually held that the resolution of the plaintiff’s
negligence claim would require the court to interpret the
CBA. 69 In contrast, a federal district court has on one
occasion found that a claim that the NFL wrongfully
administered painkillers in violation of federal statutes
controlling the distribution of prescription drugs was not
preempted by the CBA because a CBA cannot sanction or
See Dulgarian, supra note 9, at 212–220 (listing e.g., Duerson v. Nat'l
Football League, No. 12 C 2513, 2012 WL 1658353 (N.D. Ill. May 11, 2012;
Stringer v. Nat'l Football League, 474 F. Supp. 2d 894, 898 (S.D. Ohio 2007);
Holmes v. Nat'l Football League, 939 F. Supp. 517, 527 (N.D. Tex. 1996);
Williams v. Nat'l Football League, 582 F.3d 863, 868 (8th Cir. 2009); Evans v.
Ariz. Cardinals Football Club, LLC, No. CV WMN-15-1457, 2016 WL 759208,
at *2 (D. Md. Feb. 25, 2016); Evans v. Ariz. Cardinals Football Club LLC, No.
C 16-01030 WHA, 2016 WL 3566945, at *4 (N.D. Cal. July 1, 2016).
65
Duerson, 2012 WL 1658353, at *2.
66
Id.
67
Dulgarian, supra note 9, at 215 (citing Duerson, 2012 WL 1658353, at *10).
68
Stringer, 474 F. Supp. 2d at 898.
69
Dulgarian, supra note 9, at 215.
64
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control the illegal distribution of medications in violation of
federal statutes.70 Thus, the terms of the CBA did not need
to be construed, and the “prohibition against such conduct
stood independently from any CBA.” 71 The different
outcomes in these cases can likely be attributed to the nature
of the claim—state-law claims have historically been
preempted, while claims arising out of federal law have
not.72
A.
Dent I undermined the reliability of the
LMRA § 301 preemption defense by
adopting a new test for determining
whether
a
claim
requires
an
interpretation of the CBA
In 2019, the Ninth Circuit undermined the NFL’s
reliance on the preemption defense enumerated in LMRA
§301 by holding that the NFL-NFLPA CBA did not preempt
a state-law tort claim against the NFL. 73 In Dent I, the
plaintiffs—a class of over 1,000 players who received
various painkillers and other prescription drugs from NFL
team doctors without a prescription, independent diagnosis,
or a warning of the side effects and dangers of mixing
drugs—sued the NFL itself,74 contending that the manner in
which they were prescribed these drugs left these former
players with severe, long-term injuries. 75 The plaintiffs
asserted nine state-law claims, and sought punitive damages,
injunctive relief, declaratory relief, and medical
Evans, 2016 WL 759208, at *4; see also Dulgarian, supra note 9, at 215.
Evans, 2016 WL 759208, at *4.
LMRA § 301 (provides that federal law preempts state-law claims related to
rights under a collective bargaining agreement and state-law claims
substantially dependent upon the interpretation of the collective bargaining
agreement); Heard, supra note 57, at 225 (citing 20 RICHARD A. LORD,
WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 55:58 (4th ed. 2001)) (Both Duerson and
Stringer were based on state-law torts, while Evans implicated a federal drug
statute.)
73
Dent I, 902 F.3d 1109, 1116 (9th Cir. 2018).
74
As opposed to the individual teams.
75
Dent I, 902 F.3d at 1116.
70
71
72
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monitoring.76 The NFL, of course, argued that the plaintiffs’
claims were preempted under LMRA §301.77
The court rejected the NFL’s invocation of the
preemption defense. 78 In applying the first prong of the
preemption test, the court held that, because the plaintiffs
alleged that the NFL itself acted wrongly—while the NFL
CBA only addressed the obligations of the individual NFL
teams—that the plaintiffs’ cause of action did not arise from
the NFL CBA. 79 Rather, it existed independently as a
common law tort claim. 80 Next, the court applied an
especially narrow definition of what is to be considered an
“interpretation of the CBA” under the preemption test. 81
Under the “interpretation test” applied by other Federal
Circuits, the mere act of reading the CBA to determine
whether or not there was a provision prescribing the NFL’s
obligations in regard to the distribution of prescription drugs
would constitute an “interpretation”—which in turn would
mean that the second prong of the preemption test was met,
and the plaintiffs’ claims would be preempted.82 Straying
from this broad definition, the Ninth Circuit instead held—
Dent I, 902 F.3d at 1115. The plaintiffs asserted nine claims: (1) declaratory
relief, (2) medical monitoring, (3) fraud, (4) fraudulent concealment, (5)
negligent misrepresentation, (6) negligence per se, (7) loss of consortium on
behalf of class members' spouses, (8) negligent hiring of medical personnel, and
(9) negligent retention of medical personnel. Id.
77
Id. at 1115–16.
78
Id. at 1115.
79
Id. at 1118.
80
Id. at 1117–18.
81
Cain, supra note 54, at 865 n.51 (citing Robert M. Sagerian, A Penalty Flag
for Preemption: The NFL Concussion Litigation, Tortious Fraud, and the Steel
Curtain Defense of Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 35 T.
JEFFERSON L. REV. 229, 237 (2013) (detailing that the Ninth Circuit defines
"interpret" narrowly, perhaps more narrowly than other circuits)).
82
See Williams v. Nat'l Football League, 582 F.3d 863, 881 (8th Cir. 2009);
Atwater v. Nat'l Football League Players Ass'n, 626 F.3d 1170, 1175, 1183
(11th Cir. 2010). In both cases, the court having to even look at the provisions
meant that the provision was “inexplicably intertwined” with the CBA, and
therefore required an interpretation to determine whether a breach occurred.
Cain, supra note 54, at 876.
76
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for the purposes of applying the two-prong preemption test
under LMRA §301—that an “interpretation” does not arise
from a mere reference to the CBA, nor does it arise from “a
hypothetical connection between the claim and the terms of
the CBA.”83 Rather the court held that, because the NFL
CBA did not contain a provision defining the NFL’s
obligations regarding the distribution of prescription
medications, the need for the court to interpret the CBA was
obviated.84
B.
How did legal scholars believe this would
affect the 2020 NFL CBA?
After the Ninth Circuit’s seemingly player-lawsuitfriendly holding in the Dent cases, legal scholars began to
speculate about how the holding could affect the thenupcoming CBA negotiations between the NFL and the
NFLPA. 85 At the forefront of the discussion was the
holding’s effect on the utility of the preemption defense
under LMRA §301.86 For the NFL in particular, this was the
first notable case involving professional athletes asserting a
common law claim against their governing body to not have
their claim preempted by § 301.87 In fact, one scholar even
went so far as to describe the Dent holding as “provid[ing] a
viable path for current and former NFL players to litigate
against the NFL and to avoid one of the easiest and most
effective defenses the NFL has in its toolbox [the preemption
defense].” 88 This path to “un-preemptionability” is as
follows:
In planning their claims, harmed NFL
players could examine the CBA and
Dent I, 902 F.3d 1109, 1116 (9th Cir. 2018).
Id. at 1125–26.
85
See generally Cain, supra note 54; Dulgarian, supra note 9.
86
See Thomas Cain, supra note 54; Dulgarian, supra note 9. These articles
discuss whether the Ninth Circuit’s holding was correct, but that issue is beyond
the scope of this article.
87
Cain, supra note 54.
88
Id., at 861–62.
83
84

390

https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/drlj/vol22/iss2/3

14

Okun: Fixing the Dent
[Vol. 22: 377, 2022]

Fixing the Dent
PEPPERDINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION LAW JOURNAL

attempt to find a common law claim based
on any provisions where obligations are put
solely on the NFL teams (but where the
NFL itself actually acted). Then, in
pleading, these players could sue only the
NFL for acting negligently regarding the
obligation that is set forth in the claim. If a
court were to follow the Ninth Circuit's
analysis, such a claim would not be
preempted because the CBA does not
provide any obligation for the NFL itself to
act, nor would it undercut a player's
reliance on the NFL to take such action.
While the NFL would always argue it is the
wrong party being sued, it would at least be
forced to defend itself on the merits.89
Further, it has been asserted that a court rejecting
the NFL’s attempt to invoke the §301 preemption defense
against a common law claim brought by a player-plaintiff
“threatens the competitive balance by which the NFL is
characterized[,]” and would hinder an employer’s ability (on
a broader scale) to collectively bargain with their employees
“because it leaves employers who rely on a CBA[—]such as
the NFL[—]vulnerable with no outlet to ensure its policies
are uniformly enforced at all levels and locations.”90
With the general theme of these scholarly articles
being that the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Dent seriously
threatened the effectiveness of the § 301 preemption defense
for employers, these articles also offered their projections
about how these recent legal developments would influence
the NFL-NFLPA CBA. In particular, much of the language
Id., at 878–79.
Dulgarian, supra note 9, at 232 (quoting Jaime Koziol, Touchdown for the
Union: Why the NFL Needs an Instant Replay in Williams v. NFL, 9 DEPAUL
BUS. & COM. L.J. 137 , 138–39, 180 (2010) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
89
90
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that triggered the preemption defense in previous playerplaintiff suits against the NFL—thereby preempting the
common law claim—was language that “undercut the
players’ reasonable reliance on representations by the
NFL.” 91 Thus, it was postulated that the NFL could
effectively block any state common law tort claims by
“implementing positive programs [. . .]” containing language
such as “the NFL bears no responsibility for the day-to-day
treatment or medication of players" or by defining their
obligations in regard to that provision. 92 The NFLPA, of
course, could capitalize on this tremendous negotiating
leverage by negotiating better express remedies or grievance
procedures into the new CBA in exchange for players
essentially giving up the right to sue the NFL in court.93
C.
In Response to the Ninth Circuit’s
Holding in Dent, the NFL Was Able to
Include Language in the 2020 NFL CBA
Provisions Which Operates to Protect
the NFL from Common Law Liability
The 2020–2031 NFL CBA was approved on March
15th, 2020.94 This section will analyze the various changes
to the NFL CBA that may have arisen as a result of Dent,
and the potential effect that these provisions may have on the
effectiveness of the §301 preemption defense for the NFL in
future suits.
First, the sheer number of additional provisions in
Article 39 of the 2020 NFL CBA95—the section defining the
players’ rights to medical care and treatment and the duties
Cain, supra note 54, at 880. For example, “[i]n Atwater, all it took for the
court to find a need for interpreting the agreement was the phrase, ‘it being
understood that players shall be solely responsible for their personal finances.’"
Id.
92
Id.
93
Id.
94
Grant Gordon, NFL Player Vote Ratifies New CBA Through 2030 Season,
NFL (Mar. 2020), https://www.nfl.com/news/nfl-player-vote-ratifies-new-cbathrough-2030-season-0ap3000001106246.
95
NFL CBA, supra note 3, at 214–41.
91
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of the NFL and its individual teams therein—is indicative of
the NFL’s increased proclivity to avoid claims brought
against them in civil courts. In the 2011 NFL CBA, Article
39 contained seven provisions, and is just under three pages
long.96 Article 39 contains the provision that formed part of
the basis of the Dent action against the NFL. 97 These
provisions, as described in Dent,98 did not impose an express
obligation onto the NFL itself, therefore leaving it
susceptible to litigation under the Ninth Circuit’s
interpretation of the second prong of the §301 preemption
test.
In contrast, the newly adopted 2020 CBA paints a
much different picture. First, Article 39 of the 2020 NFL
CBA contains twenty-one provisions and spans twentyseven pages.99 In fact, Article 39 Section 20(f) even contains
a provision settling Evans, where the court found nothing
preempted the player’s claim because the CBA cannot
preempt federal statutes.100 Not only that, but a majority of
Article 39’s provisions share one thing in common—they
create new positive player programs while expressly
prescribing the NFL’s obligations under the CBA.
Next, the language of the individual Sections
comprising Article 39 acts to insulate the NFL from common
lawsuits brought in court. For instance, in the 2011 NFL
CBA, Article 39 Section 1(a) defines the requisite medical
credentials for club physicians, specialists, and other
medical personnel hired by the individual teams and
mandates the hiring of a number of additional medical
NFL & NFL PLAYERS ASSOCIATION COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT
1, 175–78 (2011),
https://nflpaweb.blob.core.windows.net/media/Default/PDFs/2011%20CBA%
20Updated%20with%20Side%20Letters%20thru%201-5-15.pdf [hereinafter
2011 NFL CBA].
97
Dent v. Nat’l Football League, 902 F.3d 1109, 1114–15 (9th Cir. 2018).
98
Id. at 1124–25.
99
NFL CBA, supra note 3, at 214–41.
100
Id. at 241.
96
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specialists.101 However, in the 2020 NFL CBA, Article 39
Section 1(c) provides that “the parties shall jointly appoint
an independent, third-party credentialing organization to
verify that the medical professionals appointed satisfy the
requirements of this Article 39 and possess the respective
required medical credentials.” 102 While this is without a
doubt a positive step for player safety, the provision’s
language undermines the players’ reliance on
representations made by the NFL because their bargaining
representative (the NFLPA) has agreed on their behalf to
jointly participate with the NFL in the hiring process for
Club medical specialists. As such, this likely means a player
could not sue the NFL or any of its Clubs for the same claim
asserted in Dent which involved negligent hiring or retention
claims stemming from the hiring of Club physicians. 103
Thus, because the provisions within Article 39 place the duty
to hire a qualified candidate upon the “parties,” set the
requisite medical qualifications for prospective club hired
medical personnel, and implement a third-party verification
mechanism to ensure that prospective club hired medical
personnel possess the requisite qualifications, a court would
almost certainly find the aforementioned claim to be
preempted by the 2020 NFL CBA.104
Furthermore, the 2020 NFL CBA contains several
positive player programs aimed at promoting player
safety.105 However, to avoid liability for the implementation
of these player programs, the 2020 CBA adopts an
interesting tactic—it creates a number of “joint committees.”
Most notably, Article 39 Section 20 establishes a
“Prescription Medication and Pain Management Program,”
and expressly provides that there shall be a “Joint Pain
Management Committee” overseen by both the NFL Chief
Id. at 175.
Id. at 214.
103
Dent v. Nat’l Football League, 902 F.3d 1109, 1123 (9th Cir. 2018).
104
NFL CBA, supra note 3, at 214–15.
105
Id. at 214–41.
101
102
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Medical Officer and the NFLPA Medical Director.106 The
provisions prescribing the duties of this committee mirror
the claims asserted in both Dent I and Dent II, which the
Ninth Circuit found were not preempted107—which is to say
that the NFL has an express obligation under the 2020 CBA
to oversee the policies and protocols that NFL teams adopt
in regard to pain management and prescription drug
distribution. This, in turn, means that a future suit alleging
that the NFL itself acted negligently in the handling of player
prescriptions or in the management of pain suffered by
players would also be preempted; because the CBA contains
a provision regarding prescription drug monitoring and the
NFL’s duty therein, the NFL itself is insulated from liability
from related common law claims brought in court.
One portion of Article 39 stands out in particular;
Article 39 Section 20(b)(iii) mandates that players are
required to report any prescription drugs they consume to
team doctors.108 This is precisely the sort of language that
“undercut[s] the players’ reasonable reliance” on
information given to them by Club Physicians.109 Under this
provision, the onus is on the individual player to be
forthcoming about their prescription drug use, and any legal
action seeking damages for an adverse reaction from a
player’s failure to report their prescription drug use to the
proper medical personnel would be preempted. Instead, the
injured player would have to file an Article 43 non-injury
grievance per Article 39 Section 21 if they were still under
contract for a team, or an Article 44 Injury Grievance if the
harm resulting from the ingestion of prescription medication
left them unable to perform.110 In either case, had the 2011
NFL CBA contained an analogous provision, then the claims
NFL CBA, supra note 3, at 237–241.
Dent I, 902 F.3d 1109, 1123; Dent II, 968 F.3d 1126, 1128–29 (9th Cir.
2020).
108
NFL CBA, supra note 3, at 238–39.
109
See Cain, supra note 54, at 880.
110
NFL CBA, supra note 3, at 241.
106
107
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brought in Dent I would almost certainly have been
preempted. This is because many of the player-plaintiffs
alleged that their injuries were either caused or worsened as
a result of unknowingly taking dangerous drug cocktails,
which included the prescription painkillers administered by
NFL Club physicians.111 These players claimed that they
were not given any information regarding potential side
effects or any drug combinations which could have caused
an adverse reaction. 112 Had Article 39 Section 20(b)(iii)
been in place at the time that these claims were brought, the
fact that the provision places full responsibility upon the
individual player means that the player’s “reasonable
reliance” on information given to them by club physicians
would be undermined, and thus the claim would be
preempted.113 The player-plaintiffs could avoid this effect
by pleading that the NFL violated a federal statute.114
Finally, it is no secret the NFL has long struggled to
adequately address its rampant concussion problem.115 The
league faces immense pressure to take measures ensuring
player safety—which means developing concussion
protocols, researching new equipment that reduces the
chances of suffering a concussion, and ensuring that the
playing surface is safe. 116 Of course, Article 39 has
Dent I, 902 F.3d at 1118.
Id.
113
See Cain, supra note 54, at 880.
114
See Evans v. Arizona Cardinals Football Club, LLC, No. CV WMN-151457, 2016 WL 759208, at *2 (D. Md. Feb. 25, 2016); see also Evans v.
Arizona Cardinals Football Club LLC, No. C 16-01030 WHA, 2016 WL
3566945, at *4 (N.D. Cal. July 1, 2016).
115
E.g., The NFL Tried to Intimidate Scientists Studying the Link between Pro
Football and Traumatic Brain Injury, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS (Oct.
11, 2017), https://www.ucsusa.org/resources/nfl-tried-intimidate-scientistsstudying-link-between-pro-football-and-traumatic-brain.
116
Jeremy P. Gove, Three and Out: The NFL’s Concussion Liability and How
Players Can Tackle the Problem, 14 VAND. J ENT TECH. LAW 649, 680 (2012).
An employer has a duty to provide a safe work environment for their employees.
Restatement (Second) of Agency § 492 (1958) (amended 2005). To avoid a
common law interpretation of the employer’s duty, an effective CBA provision
111
112
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provisions concerning each of these essential actions.117 In
doing so, however, it is likely that the NFL has insulated
itself from civil liability related to their handling of
concussions—an effect that may well stifle the necessary
evolution of concussion-related safety programs and
procedures. Against the backdrop of the NFL’s historied past
of covering up and ignoring its rampant concussion issue,
this notion is particularly frightening. If the NFL can have
each and every grievance against it ushered into an internal
arbitration process, the real issues that plague both the league
and its players may never come to light, and no progress
towards remedying those issues will be made.
It is suits like Dent which have spurred the NFL to
create new player-safety programs. The harsh reality for
those bound by the 2020 NFL CBA, however, is that they
will not be able to pursue any common law action in a court
of law on the basis of concussions.118 Appendix W of the
2020 NFL CBA contains what the parties have “jointly”
deemed the “Concussion Protocol.” 119 Contained within
Appendix W are a number of specific provisions which
combine to articulate the required steps that Club Physicians
and officials must follow when a player is suspected to have
sustained a sport-related concussion (SRC).120 The kicker
here is that, in order for a player to return to full participation
after going through the Concussion Protocol, an Independent
Neurological Consultant (INC) must confirm the Club
Physician’s decision to allow the player to return.121 Under
prescribes the extent of the employer’s duty such that LMRA §301 would act
to preclude a court from concluding either that: (1) the claim existed
independently from the CBA; and/or (2) that it may render a determination of
the employee-plaintiff’s claim without “substantially depend[ing] upon an
analysis” of the CBA. See Burnside v. Kiewit Pac. Corp., 491 F.3d 1053, 1059
(9th Cir. 2007).
117
NFL CBA, supra note 3, at 226–29.
118
See NFL CBA, supra note 3, at 404–20.
119
Id.
120
Id.
121
Id., at 417–20.
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any interpretation of the § 301 preemption test, this provision
likely acts to preempt any common law claims that the NFL
or one of its Clubs acted improperly.122
In return for implementing a positive player
program which seeks to protect players from suffering a
concussion and to compensate players who were injured
while playing in the NFL, the NFL managed to include
Appendix Y into the 2020 NFL CBA. 123 Appendix Y
operates as a waiver of a player’s right to sue the NFL, any
of its Clubs, “and their respective past, current and future
affiliates, directors, officers, owners, stockholders, trustees,
partners, servants and employees (excluding persons
employed as players by any Club) and all of their respective
predecessors, successors and assigns” over any claim that
the player “has, had, may now have, or may have in the
future arising out of, relating to, or in connection with any
head and/or brain injury sustained during his employment by
the Club.”124 Also notable is that Appendix Y contains a
waiver of § 1542 of the California Civil Code, which would
fall under the Ninth Circuit’s jurisdiction if the claim were
brought in Federal District Court.125 This language, in turn,
operates to insulate essentially any persons affiliated with
the NFL from common law liability arising from an alleged
violation of some common law duty—notwithstanding the
holding in Dent I.
In summation, the positive programs implemented
into the 2020 NFL CBA in order to ensure the safety and
well-being of past, present, and future players can
objectively be viewed as a positive. However, removing the
ability for player-plaintiffs to bring to light the NFL’s
transgressions through civil action was the driving force
behind many of these provisions. The Ninth Circuit taught
See generally § 301 LMRA; 29 U.S.C. § 185.
See NFL CBA, supra note 3, at 432.
124
Id.
125
See generally CAL. CIV. CODE § 1542; NFL CBA, supra note 3, at 432.
122
123
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the NFL a lesson in CBA drafting, however, which acts to
threaten the future evolution of safety protocols and other
positive player programs. The bottom line is that, if a
plaintiff alleges that the NFL breached some common law
duty, a CBA provision defining the NFL’s obligations
relating to the allegedly harmful action forming the basis of
the plaintiff’s claim would insulate the NFL from judgment
in a court of law. Rather, the allegedly harmed plaintiff
would have to seek a remedy through the avenue prescribed
in the CBA—arbitration. Thus, the NFL acted as some legal
scholars had expected—it implemented a number of positive
player programs aimed at ensuring the safety of the players,
while also including language that essentially insulates the
NFL and its Clubs from liability on the basis of any common
law action.126
D.
Not only did the NFL secure provisional
language which operates to insulate it
from common law liability, but it also
managed to get the NFLPA to budge on
the addition of a seventeenth regular
season game—an issue long-thought to
be a non-starter
The Ninth Circuit gifted the NFLPA a valuable
bargaining token going into the negotiations process
regarding the 2020 NFL CBA.127 As discussed above, the
new NFL CBA includes provisions aimed at improving
safety protocols and financial security for its retired
players.128 In doing so, the door to litigating claims in court
was shut, and with it went the opportunity to use litigation to
secure additional safety measures when it comes time to
negotiate the next NFL CBA. Of course, it cannot be denied
that these new provisions should be effective in helping to
keep players safe and healthy long-term. However, with the
See e.g., Cain, supra note 54, at 880; Dulgarian, supra note 9.
See Cain, supra note 54, at 880.
128
See discussion supra, pp. 17–23.
126
127
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NFL’s faith in the LMRA §301 preemption defense restored,
there are several provisions contained within the 2020 NFL
CBA which indicate that the NFL has no plans to place
safety over profit.129 This section will discuss how the deal
favors the NFL owners over the NFLPA and its playermembers, and the reasons why the NFLPA squandered such
an advantageous bargaining token.
First, the most pervasive criticism of the 2020 NFL
CBA is that the NFL managed to negotiate the addition of a
seventeenth game into the NFL schedule—as well as two
additional playoff games. 130 For the NFLPA, the idea of
adding a seventeenth game to the schedule was thought to be
“non-negotiable,” especially without at least obtaining a
major concession from the owners or an even split of the
revenue share and an additional “bye week” added to the
schedule. 131 For example, NFL players have long
complained about the Franchise and Transition Tags (“the
franchise tags”).132 In essence, the franchise tags are oneyear contracts that guarantee the designated player receives
either the average of the top five salaries at their position for
the previous season, or 120% of their previous salary—the
higher amount is their salary for that season.133 The primary
complaint from players is that the franchise tags act as a
deterrent to their market value because the tags “(1) take the
best free agents off of the market, and (2) leverage star
players to accept contracts prior to reaching free agency with
the specter of the Tag looming.”134 Despite expressing its
See NFL CBA, supra note 3.
Andrew Brandt, The Inequities of the Proposed CBA, Sports Illustrated
(Mar. 2020), https://www.si.com/nfl/2020/03/03/problems-with-nfl-proposedcba-17th-game-revenue-split.
131
Id.
132
Id.
133
Jon Benne & Christian D’Andrea, How does the NFL franchise tag work and
how much do players get paid, SB NATION (Mar. 2020),
https://www.sbnation.com/nfl/2017/2/14/14584232/nfl-franchise-tag-freeagency-explained.
134
Brandt, supra note 130.
129
130
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disdain for franchise tags and holding two key bargaining
tokens—the seventeenth game and the Dent holding—the
NFLPA was unable to make any change to the franchise tag
process.135 Rather, the NFL was able to get the NFLPA to
compromise on each of these issues without a split-revenue
share,136 let alone an extra bye week to offset at least some
of the risks associated with playing an additional regularseason game.137
One may argue that the NFL did what it was
supposed to do here—it created programs and protocols to
help ensure player safety. But while that is true, one must
take the motive to do so with a grain of salt. While the
individual players have their health, wellness, and careers on
the line, the NFL owners have a singular objective—making
money. 138 And looking at the NFL’s bottom line, it is
apparent that the NFL got exactly what it wanted out of the
new CBA. Not only did it arguably win in the court of public
perception by including provisions amending the league’s
marijuana testing and suspension policy, increasing the
number of roster spots that benefit fringe NFL players,
increasing base player salaries, limiting the number of
practices done in full football pads, and of course player
safety programs, but the NFL did so while hardly affecting
Id.
See NFL One Step Closer, NBC SPORTS (Feb. 26, 2020),
https://www.nbcsports.com/northwest/seattle-seahawks/nfl-one-step-closernew-cba-17-game-season-begin-2021.
137
See Geoff Schwartz, Here’s What It Would Take for NFL Players to Agree
to a 17-Game Regular Season, SB NATION (Feb. 25, 2020, 9:00 AM EST),
https://www.sbnation.com/nfl/2020/2/25/21151529/nfl-players-17-gameschedule-cba-negotiations (discussing potential health hazards to players). But
see Tom Pelissero & Ian Rapoport, NFL Plans to Expand Regular Season to 17
Games Per Team in 2021, NFL (Dec. 27, 2020, 7:00 AM),
https://www.nfl.com/news/nfl-plans-to-expand-regular-season-to-17-gamesper-team-in-2021 (discussing potential financial benefits for players).
138
See generally, e.g., Ty Schalter, Why Money, Not Fans, Drives the NFL (Apr.
3, 2012), https://bleacherreport.com/articles/1131423-why-money-not-thefans-drives-the-nfl (describing various recent actions by the NFL that suggest
prioritization of financial growth over other interests).
135
136
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its bottom line at all.139 In fact, the expansion of the NFL
playoffs by two teams alone (i.e., not even including the
additional seventeenth game) is expected to generate an
estimated $150 million in revenue for the NFL, and the
owners still get to keep a majority of this revenue.140 When
one factors in the potential revenue from sixteen additional
games on top of the NFL’s lucrative current broadcasting
deals with ESPN—which pay the NFL approximately $1.9
billion for Monday Night Football alone—and with Fox and
CBS—whose deals also already exceed $1 billion,
respectively, it becomes clear that the NFL owners will
actually make more money under the 2020 NFL CBA than
they did under previous iterations.141 Despite the potential
hundreds of millions of dollars of extra revenue generated
by the addition of these games, the players will only receive
See Geoff Schwartz, 4 Lessons NFL Players Should Take Away from This
Messy CBA Process (Mar. 10 2020, 4:10 PM EDT),
https://www.sbnation.com/nfl/2020/3/10/21173605/nfl-players-associationnflpa-cba-voting-jc-tretter-never-tweet (describing the relative ease with which
the NFL was able to handle negotiations with the NFLPA because of player’
relative lack of unified, informed opinions); Cody Benjamin, NFL's New CBA
Explained: Here's a Look at All the Season, Roster and Salary Changes, CBS
SPORTS (Mar. 16, 2020, 9:04 AM ET),
https://www.cbssports.com/nfl/news/nfls-new-cba-explained-heres-a-look-atall-the-season-roster-and-salary-changes/; 2020 NFL–NFLPA CBA: Need to
Know, NFL FOOTBALL OPERATIONS (last visited Feb. 10, 2022),
https://operations.nfl.com/inside-football-ops/players-legends/2020-nfl-nflpacba-need-to-know/.
140
Jacob Carpenter, How Many Millions the NFL Is Making from Extra Games
This Year, FORTUNE (Jan. 13, 2022, 9:30 AM PST),
https://fortune.com/2022/01/13/nfl-playoffs-expanded-17th-extra-gamerevenue; Dan Graziano, NFL CBA Approved: What Players Get in New Deal,
How Expanded Playoffs and Schedule Will Work, ESPN (Mar. 15, 2020),
https://www.espn.com/nfl/story/_/id/28901832/nfl-cba-approved-players-getnew-deal-how-expanded-playoffs-schedule-work.
141
Tom Bassam, ESPN Denies Agreeing New NFL Rights Deal: “It’s Not Done
Until You See the Press Release,” SPORTSPRO (Mar. 5, 2021),
https://www.sportspromedia.com/news/espn-monday-night-football-nflrights-burke-magnus/. See also Anthony Crupi, NFL Inks 11-Year, $105
Billion Media Rights Renewals with Partners, SPORTICO (Mar. 18, 2021, 4:05
PM),
https://www.sportico.com/business/media/2021/nfl-renews-tv-rightsfox-espn-nbc-cbs-1234623948/.
139
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about 48% of the league’s revenue—approximately one
percentage point more than the percentage split under the
2011 NFL CBA—with an additional half of a percentage
point more once the seventeenth game is added.142 This 48%
equates to about $150 million given to the players each year
after deductions—a number that pales in comparison to the
$15 billion dollars (and counting) in revenue that the NFL
generates annually.143
Finally, this 48–48.5% (depending on whether the
seventeenth game is added—which it likely will be) does not
even come into play until after the 2020 season. 144
Therefore, the NFL players’ revenue share will remain
unchanged at 47% of the league’s revenue in 2020, and then
in 2021, their revenue share will bump up to 48–48.5%.145
At that point, the increase in revenue share for the players
reaches its maximum after only two years into an elevenyear deal, leaving nine years remaining on the deal without
any increase in player revenue share.146 Not to mention that
prior to the 2011 NFL CBA, the revenue share between the
NFL and its players was roughly 50/50.147 After the salary
cap spiked in 2006, the owners renegotiated a 53/47 split in
their favor—a split the players are still allocated in 2020.148
As one former NFL team executive and current player agent
said, “in exchange for the Players giving in to a 17th game,
the Owners are willing to give back half [1.5%] of what they
took away [in 2006]. Yet, in one of the more starkly unfair

Ken Belson & Kevin Draper, N.F.L. Players Split Over Revenue Share and
Longer Season as C.B.A. Vote Looms, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 3, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/03/sports/football/nfl-cba-agreementplayers.html.
143
See id.
144
Id.
145
Brandt, supra note 130. See also Belson & Draper, supra note 142.
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Id.
147
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142
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parts of this deal, the [revenue share] would remain the same,
47%, in 2020.”149
If the NFL owners make more money under the
2020 NFL CBA than they had under previous CBAs, the
question as to what the NFL players received in return must
be asked. Here, the answer is rather underwhelming. As
mentioned previously, 150 the NFL managed to negotiate
both the addition of a seventeenth game and two additional
playoff teams151 and provisionary language shielding it from
common law liability. 152 In return for these arguably
massive concessions, the players received, inter alia, a slight
bump in revenue share, increased roster and practice squad
sizes, fewer padded practices, an increased base salary, and
a relaxed marijuana suspension and drug testing policy.153
In conclusion, as a former player stated:
Players get attracted to shiny objects in the
CBA, either because they don’t pay much
attention or misunderstand what it’s all
about. The owners care about one thing: the
bottom line. A lot of players worry about
practice time, less hitting, less testing for
weed, and other “shiny” objects that
owners don’t care about. They care about
money. I’m not naïve. I understand these
are good concessions for the players and
are helpful for some, but I hope everyone
knows these aren’t concessions for the
bottom line. I believe the players should

Id.
See discussion, supra, p. 26.
151
Dan Graziano, NFL CBA approved: What Players Get In New Deal, How
Expanded Playoffs and Schedule Will Work, ESPN (Mar. 2020),
https://www.espn.com/nfl/story/_/id/28901832/nfl-cba-approved-players-getnew-deal-how-expanded-playoffs-schedule-work.
152
See discussion supra, pp. 17–23.
153
See generally Graziano, supra note 151.
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have a higher cut of the revenue, even if
that’s not likely to happen.154
The next section will discuss what exactly went
wrong with the NFLPA’s negotiations and will offer a
solution for how the NFLPA can rectify these issues when it
comes time to negotiate the next NFL CBA.
IV.

The NFLPA’s lack of player involvement has
played a major role in the generally negative
reception of the 2020 NFL CBA
A.
Why is the new CBA so controversial?
Many past and current NFL players have voiced
their discontent regarding the 2020 NFL CBA.155 The main
issue is that the NFL’s outspoken superstars placed the
NFLPA in a tough negotiating position. The dichotomy
between the NFL’s superstars and its “middle class”
combined with the particularly high risk of suffering an
injury while playing football leaves the NFLPA in a tough
spot. On one hand, the average career length of an NFL
player is 3.3 years,156 which likely means that the “average”
player is likely to be attracted to the “shiny objects” offered
to players within the CBA.157 On the other hand, however,
the league’s biggest stars—players such as Aaron Rodgers
and Russel Wilson—used their massive social media

Schwartz, supra note 139.
Charles Curtis, 9 NFL Players Who Are Unhappy About The League's
Proposed CBA, USA TODAY (Feb. 2020),
https://ftw.usatoday.com/2020/02/nfl-cba-nflpa-players-unhappy-russellwilson-rodgers.
156
John Keim, With Average NFL Career 3.3 Years, Players Motivated To
Complete MBA Program, ESPN (July 2020),
https://www.espn.com/blog/nflnation/post/_/id/207780/current-and-formernfl-players-in-the-drivers-seat-after-completing-mba-program.
157
Curtis, supra note 155.
154
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following to voice their dissatisfaction about the thenproposed 2020 NFL CBA.158
The problem with taking to social media is these
players harming the NFLPA’s bargaining position during
negotiations. If the NFL owners know that a certain
provision won’t fly with certain outspoken players—such as
adding a seventeenth game—then they can concede on other
relatively inconsequential issues in order to appeal to the
majority of players and to the public, while also including
language in other provisions that will likely be overlooked
by other players. Moreover, while it is understandable that
players aren’t paying much attention to what the NFLPA is
doing in the “happy labor years,” ignoring the negotiation
process until the last minute and rendering a vote without
fully considering the ramifications of the vote contributes to
the division of the player base. 159 The issue of an illinformed player base becomes exacerbated with the use of
social media; as Geoff Schwartz, a former player, wrote
regarding the effect of social media on the CBA negotiations
process:
The issue becomes [important] when CBA
negotiations start, years out from a new
deal. Players are so used to tuning out
during the meetings [with the NFLPA], and
then when they are handed a 456-page
CBA proposal, they use their social media
platforms to voice concerns over a situation
they haven’t followed at all.160
This is especially the case in regard to the “superstars” who
share their thoughts with the public without being “in the

Elizabeth Swinton, NFL Players React to Proposed Collective Bargaining
Agreement, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Feb. 2020),
https://www.si.com/nfl/2020/02/26/russell-wilson-aaron-rodgers-oppose-nflcba-owners.
159
Schwartz, supra note 139.
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know” 161 —i.e., following the negotiations process to the
extent that they can express their opinion on the basis of fact,
rather than a knee-jerk reaction. 162 When these veteran
players do express their opinions on social media, it is likely
that “[y]ounger players who look up to these veterans might
blindly follow what they say without educating themselves,”
which only contributes to the confusion.163 In fact, so many
players requested to change their vote after they had already
submitted it that the NFLPA had to put to a vote by the player
representatives whether players should be able to change
their vote, but it was voted down.164 When the margins are
as slim as they were here—the new CBA passed by a vote of
1,019 to 959 165 —every single vote matters and a player
voting without being adequately informed harms the
efficacy of the agreement for the player base as a whole.166
B.
How can the NFLPA ensure that they do
not face similar issues when it comes
time to negotiate the next CBA?
In order to ensure that future NFL CBA negotiations
proceed more smoothly, the NFLPA must take steps to more
heavily involve its veterans and stars. 167 The purpose in
doing so is threefold: (1) it solves the NFLPA’s pervasive
social media issue by ensuring that players who are
expressing their opinion during future CBA negotiations are
doing so with adequate information; (2) older players will be
more inclined than younger players to consider the less
glamourous provisions such as retirement benefits and
healthcare plans; 168 and (3) older players will be more
capable of encouraging younger players to involve
Id.
See id.
163
Id.
164
Id.
165
Gordon, supra note 94.
166
See id.
167
Schwartz, supra note 139.
168
Id.
161
162

Published by Pepperdine Digital Commons, 2022

407

31

Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal, Vol. 22, Iss. 2 [2022], Art. 3
[Vol. 22: 377, 2022]

Fixing the Dent
PEPPERDINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION LAW JOURNAL

themselves in the negotiations process. 169 Regardless of
whether these veteran players have interests that diverge
from the younger players within the NFL, steps must be
taken by the NFLPA to ensure that each player is casting
their vote with full knowledge of the implications therein.
Continued failure on behalf of the NFLPA to do so will only
exacerbate the discontent between the NFLPA and its player
base, thereby limiting the NFLPA’s ability to effectively
negotiate on behalf of its players. If they cannot get every
player to agree to the same terms, at the very least efforts
must be made to ensure that every player is on the same page
regarding the implication of their vote.
VI.

Conclusion
In sum, the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Dent opened
the door for NFL players past and present to seek a remedy
resulting from the NFL’s alleged misconduct in the court
system. This is particularly important for the players, as the
NFL has not shown a propensity to choose player safety over
profits in the past, and one of the only forces that has caused
the NFL to change its course has been through lawsuits and
public scrutiny. However, the new 2020 NFL CBA closes
this potential door to litigation by including a number of
provisions throughout which operate to insulate the NFL or
any of its Clubs from common law liability. The
advantageous bargaining position the NFLPA was placed in
after Dent was handed down was squandered in the
negotiations process due in part to an under-informed player
base and misinformation spread on social media. In order to
ensure that future CBA negotiations proceed more smoothly,
the NFLPA must work to more heavily involve its veterans
and stars in order to encourage younger players to keep
informed.
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